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Some Final Observations on Legal
Intellectual History
ROBERT W. GORDON†
This has been an incredibly rich array of papers and
themes. I am not going to try to sum up all the points that
have been made and restate all the points into the form of
motions that we could all vote on and adopt or reject. All I
feel able to do is to provoke further discussion among us on
top of the discussions we’ve had already. All I will try is just
to identify a few themes that ran through our discussions.
In a conference like this there is always at some point the
necessary jump to abstraction, where issues of definition,
theory and method come to the fore. This Conference was no
exception; and of course there’s nothing wrong with that
because basic questions of theory and method, although
ultimately unanswerable, are like the beasts of the jungle in
the dark. They are always lurking out there threatening to
sabotage everything that we do. I personally know many
people who have derailed their own careers because they felt
unable to answer these larger questions of theory and method
and were diverted into some other field entirely. Others,
perhaps sensibly, keep their heads down and on the
immediate road ahead, so as to avoid being paralyzed by the
unanswerable.
What is intellectual history? Is it the history of
intellectuals? Or is it the history of anybody who has an idea
and who utters that idea or anybody who is influenced by that
idea or for that matter acts on the basis of that idea? One
thing that we all seem to be fairly clear about is that we
shouldn’t limit intellectual history to high falutin’ theorizers,
the high mandarins of the system, the philosophers or several
steps down from philosophers, the producers of legal thought,
or producers of legal doctrine or writers of treatises. We are
interested in intellectuals in the vernacular, people who are

† Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
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arguing, justifying, categorizing, and often simply describing
history.
If you do law, at some point people are going to ask you,
“What is law?” and ask you to distinguish law from non-legal
phenomena. Usually, this is not a productive endeavor
because one just has to be clear at the outset what your
working conceptions are going to be for a particular project—
what you are going to describe as law and what you are not
going to describe as law. If you are a believer, as many of us
are, in notions of legal pluralism, then you believe that there
are plural sovereigns in society and they all make some kind
of law. “What is law?” is a question much like “Who is an
intellectual?” You are going to come across folks who, simply
by enacting a custom, or adapting or modifying one—like
Laura Edwards’s women and slaves, people with little official
legal personality making claims of right with respect to
textiles—are acting as law makers of a particular
community.
So sometimes we just have to distinguish what level and
order of law we are talking about. If you get very strict about
restricting law to law made and enforced by state officials,
then you would face challenges such as one I used to hear as
a law teacher: “But that’s not law!” What were you talking
about to elicit such a question? You might have been talking
about tax. Or you were talking about policy-making lobbyists
who come to a legislature with draft legislation and somebody
says, “That’s not law!” Of course, it proposes to be law, it
wants to be law. Again, I think if one can for a particular
project try to settle these definitional and conceptual issues
with some stipulations at the beginning I think one avoids a
lot of problems.
Capitalism is another matter entirely. Many have tried
to define capitalism and perished at the attempt. It is an
extremely difficult enterprise—particularly if one attempts
to come up with fairly precise technical definitions that don’t
reflect the purpose for which people are using the term
because they are usually using it as a big contested cloudy
cluster concept in which private owners of property or rights
holders of some sort in property make basic decisions about
how to combine and/or allocate, goods and services in an
economy. It’s clear that capitalism in this sense is consistent
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with a wide variety of both cultural and governmental
schemes. Sometimes capitalism in this sense exists as, for
example, it did in China for a long time or in other
communities which were in many ways authoritarian states.
Even in such states there are communities of traders who are
creating markets and trading there in what are by any
reasonable definition capitalist markets. Other people use
capitalism in a much more global sense. They talk about a
whole system of social relations that exists on a society-wide
or global level and I think that’s probably the more
conventional sense in which people talk about capitalism, as
in the phrase “under capitalism”—the Marxist notion that
there are certain kinds of underlying modes of production
which in turn determine relations of production, these result
in the social system we know of as capitalism.
In that sense what kind of concept is “capitalism”? Many
of the papers here take a lot of care to try to take this very
general notion apart and to reduce its determining capacity
in order to specify very concretely for very particular
historical locations and situations the modes and varieties of
capitalism, including the modes and varieties in which
capitalist relations are embedded within nation states (or
legal systems or global politics) that condition and constrain
and regulate their operations. It’s impossible to imagine what
a pure capitalist society would be like, meaning a society of
markets without legal enforcement, “order without law.”
There’s never really been such a thing. It exists only in
libertarian fantasy and there’s something a little endearing
about these libertarian fantasies, the lengths to which they
will go to try and specify in as few statements as possible the
operations of these societies—and some of them are quite
successful! They substitute protection gangs that you can pay
for police protection; they substitute similar rackets for
property protection. Critical historians or political
economists try to generalize these moves: to show that
capitalist markets can thrive in a wide variety of legal
arrangements, from societies without much in the way of
centralized state capacity, which leave regulation of property
relations and management of risks to clans or trades or
extended kinship or religious cooperatives, to societies with
very strong bureaucratic states which operate to subsidize
ventures, socialize risks, and regulate harms. Such insights
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as often as not serve a political project. By disassembling the
component parts of particular forms of capitalism we try to
eliminate the sense of the determinacy of current
arrangements—the illusion that some set of social
formations we are willing to call capitalism is inevitable and
always takes a single global determining form. The method
is to show that all the little pieces of a capitalism have been
put together through historically contingent sets of local
initiatives. Markets are “embedded” in particular local
practices and institutions. (At this Conference, we saw, Chris
Desan, Ajay Mehrotra, and Ed Purcell deploying versions of
this method.)1 It makes the whole thing seem so much more
manageable and changeable—alternate paths not taken are
exposed by historical inquiry. Even if you can’t now take the
path that you didn’t take back then because it’s too late, the
depiction of alternative tracks suggests possibilities for
similar variations on our present condition.
Now that hopeful notion I think is somewhat dissipated
by Karl Polanyi’s thesis that although capitalism may be—
and actually is—a set of quite particular arrangements,
constituted by quite particular customary practices and legal
regulations and so very variable across place and time from
one place to another, nonetheless, people come to think of that
particularity as a global determining force and that the
collective reification of all of these contingent local historical
practices into a giant big thing, a naturalized and objectiveseeming process or force, eventually transforms society.
Probably many of you know the wonderful book by Bill
Reddy about labor relations in the French textile trade.2
Without sentimentalizing them, Reddy shows how the labor
relations are initially conceived of by many of these producers

1. Christine Desan, The Market Itself as Insider Trading (Sept. 27, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript), http://baldycenter.info/conferences/opportunities-forlaws-intellectual-history/cle.html; see also Ajay K. Mehrotra, A Bridge Between:
Law and the New Intellectual Histories of Capitalism, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2016);
Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Capitalism and Risk: Concepts, Consequences, and
Ideologies, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 23 (2016).
2. WILLIAM REDDY, THE RISE OF MARKET CULTURE: THE TEXTILE TRADE
FRENCH SOCIETY, 1750–1900 (1987).
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as quasi-familial (this is in line with Rebecca Rix’s work)3—
their paternal relations, their communal relations, are part
of the domain of the patron. It’s not quite clear how it
happens in this account, but essentially what happens, to cut
a long story short, is that market theorizing takes over. You
start actually to think of your laborer as a commodity, as a
factor input to production, and so that you should substitute
for it. And, if you should always look for cheaper sources, you
should substitute technology if that’s cheaper, and, of course,
most importantly (this is a sort of quasi-Marxist treatment)
you cease to think of the laborers as people under your care,
as members of your family or community; you commoditize
them. All this is like a feedback effect of the reification of all
of these local practices into a global determining force. At this
Conference we heard of similar processes by which
economists’ ways of thinking about the economy, as being
composed of the factors of land, capital and labor, become
abstracted into thinking about risk.
We also saw intellectual and cultural and political and
social historians trying to resist the totalizing force of the
mega concept. Bureaucracy is not the uniform Weberian
phenomenon that we are familiar with. It’s not the kind of
inevitable governing form of modernity any more than
capitalism is the inevitable economic form, but a set of
variable arrangements constituted in different ways. Nick
Parrillo has just written an enormous book about how
American bureaucracy really isn’t at all like European
bureaucracy.4 The people are not recruited the same way,
they are not paid the same way, they don’t follow the
Weberian rules. Somebody might point out, “Well yeah, but
it’s still called bureaucracy, right?” But that insight seems
typical of the special contributions historians of law and legal
culture can make to debates about what constitutes the
institutions and experience of modernity.

3. Rebecca A. Rix, Popular Culture: Opportunities for an Intellectual History
of Transactional Lawmaking (Oct. 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://baldycenter.info/conferences/opportunities-for-laws-intellectual-history/
cle.html.
4. NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 (2013).
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Another and similar contribution is the substitution of
some kinds of legal pluralism for legal centralism,
challenging the view of law as emanating from the center and
spreading out to various peripheries and eventually
colonizing them. Laura Edwards has written a book which
describes a set of local customary legal arrangements in the
post-Revolutionary Carolinas which don’t derive from or
answer to the authority nor are derivative of centrally
produced institutions or doctrine, which are not top-down,
but which over time become top down, as lawyers bring them
into a hierarchy of authority.5 Then in her paper for this
Conference, Laura talks to us about very local regimes of
claiming and trading, of customary rights to things, these
textiles—textiles as possessions which can be claimed by
people who have no formal-legal rights to possess, textiles
that are tradeable by people who have no rights to trade,
possessions that are patrimony but also are currency.6
Interestingly enough, even in Laura’s narrative there is
present a threat that legal centralism is going to come along
and extirpate all of these cultural local practices. She didn’t
really say this—probably she wouldn’t defend it; she
shouldn’t be asked to—but multiple law-making sovereigns
existing side by side in society is the usual nature of things,
not a pre-modern aberration which has been eliminated by
the spread of capitalism and central law. If anything, I think
these sovereigns have proliferated with the rise of private
governance and new normative law-making communities
which have been secreted in the interstices of the modern
state.
Do the rule of law—thought of as the bringing of social
relations under the control of centrally produced and
theorized and rationalized law—and legal doctrine—another
kind of reified thing—produce an artificially imposed order
that masquerades as a real determining force, and that
therefore, as Cynthia Nicoletti suggested at our Conference,7
5. LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE: LEGAL CULTURE AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH (2009).
6. Laura F. Edwards,
64 BUFF. L. REV. 193 (2016).

Textiles:

Popular

Culture

and

the

Law,

7. Cynthia Nicoletti, Writing the Social History of Legal Doctrine,
64 BUFF. L. REV. 121 (2016).
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may actually operate as a force in the lives of the lawyers and
judges and people who believe in it? Do people come to believe
that property is only what law says it is, that a harm is only
real if the law recognizes it as a harm, that an action is
morally justified if the law says you can do the act so long as
you pay for it or its benefits outweigh its costs, and that rulefollowing is a greater good than doing particularized justice?
Is the autonomy of law the kind of social construct whose
force varies over time and within various legal fields? Some
argue, as Chris Tomlins did at our Conference,8 that the
integrating concepts that used to hold together doctrines as
systems have disintegrated in our own disenchanted age, so
nothing is left but the rubble of past modes, selectively
invoked and reinvigorated.
Generally, historians like to point to the local and
customary and they like to resist the grand narrative,
particularly the grand narrative of modernization. I put a lot
of work myself into resisting the grand narrative of
modernization, but some of the contributions to our
Conference actually take rather a different point of view. We
have Chris Desan’s small private club of law makers in the
Chicago exchange who are definitely engaged in a kind of topdown law-making, having arrogated to themselves the
authority to define rules that through their trading can set
prices for [salaries of] buyers of commodities all over America
and indeed in many instances all over the world.9 So hers is
very much a story of the kind that Duncan Kennedy tells in
his Three Globalizations of Legal Thought10—in which modes
of lawmaking begin in relatively concentrated centers of
elites and then spread out and become part of the common
discourse of society generally.
One emphasis which you would expect from a group of
historians of course is historicism. Every time we try to
generalize categories across time we are met with the
question: well, are we talking about the same things? When
8. Christopher
Tomlins,
64 BUFF. L. REV. 61 (2016).
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9. Desan, supra note 1.
10. Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–
2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (David M. Trubek & Alvaro
Santos eds., 2006).
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we talk about, say, bureaucracy or legal doctrine in 1850 is
that the same thing as bureaucracy in 1950? Clearly it’s not.
Does it have enough in common so we can talk legitimately
about it as if it were? Is there any way to avoid doing that? If
people want to make statements about causality or
comparative statements across societies, are such
generalizations possible, given all of the local and temporal
variations that are at work, that are so painstaking to point
out? I remember once when I was giving the usual sort of
disaggregating paper somewhere, Roberto Unger said to me
something to the effect of, “You are a dangerous person; you
are making comparative history impossible!” I said, “Well,
that’s a heavy responsibility.” (Think of all those jobs lost.
Comparative history departments—almost unbearable.) But
I see what he meant.
Again, Chris Tomlins is, I think, very disturbed by all of
this because, like other historians, legal historians read
Clifford Geertz and said, “Look, what we’ve being doing all
along is ‘thick description,’ which is not the same thing as
constructing social-science models of causation, but is a
legitimate and valuable activity.” So we did more of it. Just
as when historians read Thomas Kuhn and said, “This story
of thought-structures, idea-clusters for explaining and
making sense of experience, dissolving and reforming over
time, this too is familiar. It’s also what we do.” At our
Conference there were many suggestions that maybe we have
been over-influenced by these models—that this thick
description has taken us to a point where what we produce,
these virtuoso descriptions of a set of cultural practices lying
in pieces on the ground—is all there is: a miscellaneous
jumble of practices that theorists or intellectuals (usually
working for ruling elites, but not always, see, e.g., Marxism)
have built into a system and attributed determining force.
But, when you take it apart, you see the system is an illusion.
The disassembled pieces just lie there. So what significance
does the historical experience have for us other than the fact
that it was? What can you make of our efforts for studying
other times and places and for the present day? Does the
process of critique, disaggregation, demystification, and
historicizing big systems like capitalism, classical legalism,
bureaucracy, centralized legal doctrine, lead simply to
passivity and paralysis? One would like to think our efforts
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would encourage people to believe that innovation will not,
contrary to what conservatives (meaning here simply people
who want to conserve because they fear change) believe,
bring down the whole system of capitalism under the rule of
law and with them everything valuable about the conditions
of modernity.
Anyway, quite aside from the potential political benefits
of the work presented here, it’s refreshing and interesting
and provocative on a whole order of magnitude above what
you’re likely to hear at the usual law school workshop. From
talking to others there, I was not the only person who came
out of that weekend feeling newly puzzled and perplexed
about basic issues in our work, but also inspired.

